City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Theses and Dissertations

Hunter College

Spring 5-15-2020

Dispute Initiation in the World Trade Organization: An Evaluation
of Trade Complaints Filed with the U.S. Trade Representative’s
Office Between 1995 and 2004
Jennifer Dikler
CUNY Hunter College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/579
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Dispute Initiation in the World Trade Organization: An Evaluation of Trade Complaints Filed
with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office Between 1995 and 2004
by
Jennifer Dikler

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Economics, Hunter College
The City University of New York

2020

May 12, 2020

Jonathan Conning

Date

Signature of Thesis Sponsor

May 12, 2020

Matthew Baker

Date

Signature of Second Reader

Table of Contents
Acknowledgment

1

Abstract

2

Introduction

3

Background

5

Literature Review
Trade Gravity Model
Settlement Theory
Polity in Dispute Initiation
Concentration of Trade Barriers

11
11
15
20
21

Hypothesis

22

Data

23

Methods

26

Results
Part I
Part II
Limitations

27
27
29
32

Conclusion

33

Figures

35

Tables

36

Works Cited

40

Acknowledgment
I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Jonathan Conning, who guided me through
this convoluted process and always offered me insightful comments and helpful next steps.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my friends and family, who unconditionally love and
support me. Their continued belief in me – throughout this thesis and beyond – has always made
school feel easier and more enjoyable, and has served as a constant reminder that hard work
always pays off. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them.
Finally, I would like to thank Alexandra – my boss, but also my mentor, support system, and
constant source of inspiration. Not only has she accommodated my schedule for six years as I
finished high school, my undergraduate and graduate degrees, and numerous internships and
extracurriculars, but she has always given me a chance to learn, and trusted me to match her
level of effort and care for the work that we do and the people we help.
Thank you.

1

Abstract
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) encompasses a Dispute Resolution System that is widely
regarded as efficient: cases are resolved within a relatively short time frame and compliance with
rulings has been high. The dispute resolution mechanism encompasses three phases: consultation,
arbitration through a panel, and arbitration through an appellate body if a panel decision is
appealed. While there exists an extensive body of literature exploring the determinants of
settlement at the consultation stage of the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, I explore the
determinants of settlement prior to the initiation of any sort of formal proceedings in a database of
2,334 complaints filed at the USTR between 1995 and 2004. My outcome variable is a binary that
represents the complaints filed with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (“USTR”),
distinguishing between those that the USTR chooses to escalate into a WTO dispute and those it
chooses to resolve through other means. My base specification is motivated by a simplified gravity
model which I later augment to other variables of interest including a ‘continuity’ variable that
codes for the nature of the good or service in dispute, and for a measure of the concentration of the
trade barrier at hand. I also explore polity scores of the trading partner enacting the barrier. I find
that the gravity model helps explain whether the USTR escalates a complaint into a dispute, and
continuity, concentration, and polity all help increase the probability that the USTR escalates a
complaint into a WTO dispute. My results affirm that the gravity model continues to hold
explanatory power and point to the importance of the characteristics of the barrier itself in
explaining WTO dispute initiation.
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Introduction
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) encompasses a Dispute Resolution System that
is widely regarded as efficient: cases are resolved in accordance with a clear protocol and within
a relatively short time frame, and compliance with rulings is generally high. The WTO’s success
as an efficient multilateral institution in its first two decades of existence have garnered
legitimacy for the trade institution, and have invited numerous studies surrounding its complex
dispute resolution mechanism. Notably, however, less research has been performed on the trade
barriers that end up as the focus of this dispute resolution mechanism before they become WTO
disputes. This paper seeks to shed more explanatory power on the attributes of complaints that
the U.S. government chooses to pursue and escalate into WTO disputes.
Though the gravity model has long been used to predict trade flows between two
countries, I explore whether the model is able to explain the United States’ dispute propensity,
and validate the notion that larger economies and those with a greater bilateral trade volume
become involved in disputes disproportionately often. Specifically, I test whether the economic
size and trade volume between the U.S. and its trading partners helps predict if the U.S. Trade
Representative’s Office (USTR) will escalate a complaint into a WTO dispute. Prior literature
suggests that the gravity model is efficient in predicting the amount of WTO disputes between
two countries, but I test whether it successfully predicts the escalation of a complaint into a
dispute, specifically in relation to the United States. To do so, I examine 2,334 complaints filed
with the USTR between 1995 and 2004, 114 of which were escalated by the USTR into WTO
disputes. If the gravity model proves to be significant in explaining dispute escalation, this
confirms that economy size and trade volume are prime predictors of whether the USTR will
escalate a complaint.
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In combination with the classic gravity model, I also explore additional variables that
theory suggests may help augment the original specification. I first test a novel variable that
controls for the nature of the complaint in question. Namely, I manually code for a binary
variable that distinguishes between complaints of a relatively continuous nature, as opposed to
those that are non-continuous, and test whether it has an effect on whether the USTR escalates
the case at hand. For example, cases surrounding import restrictions provide greater bargaining
room than cases that have to with bans of certain goods based on a technical issue, because they
have a larger set of possible solutions. In the case of import restrictions, both countries can
advocate for their side and reach a middle ground, while a case surrounding a ban will have a
clear winner and loser, no matter whether the ban gets lifted or remains in place. Hence, the first
group of cases are relatively easier to settle and are considered “continuous.”
Though the variable has previously been used to explain whether disputes settle in the
first phase of WTO proceedings, it has not been used to explain dispute initiation. Resolving
disputes outside of formal adjudication, i.e. reaching a settlement, is generally regarded as more
efficient than judicial proceedings due to lower costs and favorable outcomes that are more likely
to come with settlement. Apart from being less expensive and producing quicker results,
settlement helps nations avoid all the legal complexities that come with formal judicial
proceedings, and allows the details of proceedings to escape the public eye. Settlement theory
predicts that continuous cases are more likely to settle outside of formal adjudication, due to the
increased bargaining room that they provide. I therefore hypothesize that this remains the case
when it comes to the trade barriers that formulate the complaints that have the potential to be
escalated into WTO disputes.
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I also explore whether the polity level of a trading partner, the concentration nature of a
barrier (i.e. whether the barrier affects many countries or just the United States), and fixed year
effects help explain which complaints the USTR chooses to escalate to the WTO. Theory
suggests that more democratic states are likely to settle outside of formal adjudication. Further,
studies have shown that the United States is more likely to challenge policies that are targeted
specifically at the U.S., rather than at a vast number of countries.
Though the gravity model is widespread in literature concerning trade and dispute
resolution in the WTO, it has not yet been used to explain my variable of interest, i.e., what
affects the USTR’s decision to escalate a complaint into a dispute. Further, the additional
variables that I am interested in have the potential to create a unique augmented gravity model
that has not been tested before.
Background
Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization is a relatively novel institution that
emerged out of the earlier-established General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”).
Despite its young age, the WTO’s impact on international law and general international relations
has been transformative. In the last two decades, the organization has been able to improve trade
by establishing clear rules of trade between nations and providing a channel for dispute
resolution that aims for compliance, efficiency, and efficacy. In numerous cases, the WTO has
achieved all three. However, through dispute resolution, the WTO has been found to favor larger
members such as the United States and European Union, both, in terms of participation and in
terms of outcome. Such is the case because these parties can afford the WTO’s extremely high
litigation costs and fare better in handling the legal complexities of its dispute resolution system.
Even then, as this paper explores, the United States only escalates a minority of complaints that it
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receives into formal WTO disputes.
Though disputes are filed by WTO members, i.e. countries, in the United States they are
often escalations of complaints filed by domestic entities such as corporations. The United States
has the legal capacity and economic might to pursue more disputes than most other WTO
members, but only a fraction of the complaints filed with the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office
actually turn into disputes. This paper seeks to provide a novel explanation for why these
complaints are escalated, based on an augmented gravity model.
History of Trade Institutions
Trade, which refers to the exchange of goods and services, has been traced back to
prehistoric times – arising alongside the development of human communication. For the purpose
of this paper, I will be examining contemporary international trade relations and the institutions
governing these relations throughout the 20th century. I will then explain the factors that created
the need for the World Trade Organization and culminated in its eventual formation.
International trade generally flourished prior to World War I: despite a lack of
multilateral cooperation or institutional oversight, countries enacted relatively low trade barriers
which resulted in very little trade discrimination. World War I and the economic reconstruction
that followed brought about protection that led to significant trade barriers and no mechanisms to
reduce them, creating a global economy that stood in stark contrast to that of the pre-war era.
Following the economically dismal interwar period and the war that ensued, countries looked at
the end of World War II as a blank slate – a chance to finally put in place mechanisms through
which the international community could come together and efficiently lower trade barriers.
Motivated by the international economic failure that occurred during the interwar period,
countries came together and signed the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. The international
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treaty, signed by 44 countries, aimed to restore the international economy and provide it with
stability. In effect, the Bretton Woods Agreement set up the modern rules and institutions that
continue to govern the international political economy to this day. Among the institutions set up
by Bretton Woods were the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
Following the Bretton Woods Agreement, in 1947, 23 countries agreed to what would
become the predecessor to the World Trade Organization – the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT). This agreement was specifically meant to restrict protectionism and trade
barriers in order to avoid future economic slowdowns. The signing of the GATT was indicative
of the paradigm shift that had commenced at the time – a shift that stressed the importance and
benefits of free trade as opposed to protectionism and, as a result, encouraged the eventual
formation of regional trade agreements. In 1992, for example, the European Union eliminated its
internal barriers to trade between its members, both in goods and in labor. In 1994, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States also entered into a regional trade agreement known as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
As discussed by Douglas Irwin in “The GATT in Historical Perspective,” the GATT
featured both, many achievements and many shortcomings. Its initial success was indisputable –
the 23 countries that participated in its first round implemented tariff cuts and implemented those
cuts on a Most-Favored Nation (MFN) basis, meaning they were non-discriminatory.
Furthermore, countries agreed to lock-in these trade cuts, which proved crucial in helping
prevent backsliding in terms of tariffs as other trade barriers arose in the coming decades.
Despite this early success, the following 15 years saw progress in the GATT slow down
significantly. Though GATT membership expanded, the institution “made only minor progress
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in reducing tariffs” (Irwin 325). Members became frustrated at the GATT’s process. Particularly,
the GATT lacked clear dispute resolution mechanisms, resulting in a backlog of cases that never
got solved. This inefficiency, coupled with a lack of enforcement and, hence, compliance with
rulings, led the GATT to lose most of its legitimacy as an institution.
History of the WTO
In 1994, the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement marked the completion of the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations, which resulted in the formation of the World Trade Organization.
The WTO was meant to replace several parts of the GATT, focusing on “liberalizing agricultural
trade, eliminating voluntary restraint agreements, and strengthening dispute settlement
procedures” while preserving the GATT and its initial main purpose (Irwin 327).
The WTO Dispute Resolution System’s legal basis is the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). The DSU outlines a very clear and streamlined process that involves three
clear stages of solving a dispute: consultation, empanelment, and appellate hearings. Once a
member country complains to the WTO, this serves as a formal request for consultations, which
constitute the first stage of dispute resolution in the WTO and take up to 60 days. Attorneys on
behalf of the Complainant and Respondent are forced to talk to each other to see if they can settle
their differences by themselves or through mediation, even though these parties “may have
already gone through extensive bilateral attempts to solve the problem” (Stanton 54). Notably, as
a way to shield governments from domestic interests, consultations occur behind closed doors. It
is also critical to note that the “settlement” sought through consultations in the first stage of the
WTO dispute resolution process occurs in the context of formal adjudication. This is in contrast
to a resolution that occurs prior to any sort of legal proceedings, which is the settlement that I am
interested in exploring in this paper.
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If a case is unable to be resolved through settlement or a mutually-agreed solution
(MAS), i.e., consultations fail, the Complainant may initiate the appointment of a panel. It takes
up to 45 days for this three-person panel to be appointed, and its members have to be approved
by both parties. If they cannot agree, the WTO Director-General may be asked to appoint
individuals onto the panel instead. Once formed, the dispute officially enters the second stage of
dispute resolution. The panel takes an additional six months to gather evidence, hold meetings,
listen to oral arguments, seek expert advice, draw conclusions and issue a report. The report
contains a factual background, the panel’s findings and conclusions, and is normally adopted by
the Dispute Settlement Body within 60 days.
Parties then have the right to appeal a panel’s decision through the Appellate Body, a
permanent seven-member body which is set up by the Dispute Settlement Body and broadly
represents the range of WTO membership. Of this body, three judges are appointed to consider
an individual appeal. Once they are appointed, the case moves into the third stage of dispute
resolution, and the Appellate Body makes a decision based exclusively on issues of law. Appeals
are usually handled within 60 to 90 days and, once adopted, are legally binding on the countries
affected.
The WTO is unique in that its dispute settlement system is completely decentralized,
meaning there is no central body to police the organization’s members throughout and after the
dispute resolution process. This precludes the organization from having enforcement or
punishment power (other than authorization of retaliatory measures in cases of failure of
compliance) over its technically binding legal rulings, known as “recommendations” (Busch et
al. 4). That the WTO has been able to garner so much legitimacy and such high member
participation without any enforcement power is notable.
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Overall, the WTO has been regarded as a large success in comparison to its predecessor,
the GATT. Though the WTO is far from perfect, its “sophisticated body of jurisprudence” has
allowed cases to get solved in a relatively quick timeframe (Busch et al. 1). The institution’s
legitimacy is further bolstered due to the fact that it is the only international legal body that,
through the authorization of retaliatory measures, has any sort of enforcement discretion over
binding commitments of so many states. Crucially, compliance with WTO rulings has also been
relatively high as opposed to compliance within the GATT. Though decisions rendered through
both institutions are not technically enforceable, non-compliance in the GATT was far more
common, most often taking the form of Respondents not implementing rulings. In terms of
inclusiveness, the WTO is certainly more equitable than the GATT, encouraging participation
among far more developing countries.
However, the institution still faces various lines of criticisms. The most important line of
issues with the WTO, with regard to this paper, is that WTO dispute initiation is notoriously an
expensive and convoluted process that even large and economically powerful players such as the
United States may be wary of. As a result, only a minority of complaints are raised to the status
of disputes.
A Complaint’s Journey to the WTO in the United States
For the purposes of this paper, I detail how a complaint becomes a dispute, specifically in
the United States. The U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (“USTR”) initiates disputes in the
WTO on behalf of the United States under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The USTR is
able to do so through two channels: either by complaint of an interested party, or on its own
accord. Though private individuals and corporations do not have direct access to the WTO. they
are able to file such complaints, which may later be escalated into disputes by the USTR. This is
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a critical component of the dispute resolution system: in effect, it gives domestic entities in the
United States a pathway to resolving an issue caused by the decisions of other countries.
It is important to note that the United States keeps track of “allegedly WTO-illegal trade
barriers reported to them by internationally active firms” (Yildirim et al. 39). This gives the
USTR access to a list of complaints, any of which it may decide to escalate and bring to the
WTO as a dispute.
Literature Review
Broadly, the literature relevant to this study tends to deal with the following topics:
analysis of the explanatory model of the gravity model as it relates to trade and disputes within
the World Trade Organization, how settlement theory has played into the World Trade
Organization’s dispute resolution mechanism thus far, how the concentration of a trade barrier
affects its likelihood of being challenge in the WTO, and how a nature’s polity level generally
affects dispute initiation. Each of the subsections that follows provides justification for the key
variables and mechanisms in my regressions.
Trade Gravity Model
The gravity trade model is based on an adaptation of Newton’s universal law of
gravitation in physics, and is used to predict the amount of interaction between two places. As
noted by a 1999 study, “since the latter half of the nineteenth century, it has been used to explain
social flows, primarily migration” (Wall 1999). The classic gravity model of international trade
was introduced by Jan Tinbergen in his 1962 paper titled “An Analysis of World Trade Flows.”
By utilizing GDP to account for countries’ economic size in combination with distance between
the countries, Tinbergen was able to show that economic size and the distance between two units
were significant determinants of empirical bilateral trade flows. Specifically, he found that as
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distance between two countries grows, trade tends to fall, much like the force of gravitation
diminishes when two bodies are separated. Under the classic form of this model in log-linear
form, using Yi and Yj to denote national incomes, and Dij to denote distance, trade between
countries i and j can be expressed as:
ln 𝑋!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑌! + 𝛾 ln 𝑌" − 𝛿 ln 𝐷!"

where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are positive constants.
Tinbergen’s finding has since been shown to be extremely robust, and the model has been
used in hundreds of research papers relating to trade, including those that have been used to
shape trade policy. As discussed by Yotov et al. in their 2016 paper titled “ An Advanced Guide
to Trade Policy Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model,” the model is advantageous in that it is
very intuitive, is grounded in solid theoretical foundations, offers a realistic general equilibrium
environment, a flexible structure, and has strong predictive power. In 1985, Jeffrey Bergstrand
expanded on Tinbergen’s model in his paper “The gravity equation in international trade: Some
microeconomic foundations and empirical evidence,” in which he found that price and exchange
rate variables “have plausible and significant effects on aggregate trade flows.” This finding
rejected the assumption of perfect international product substitutability, utilized by the classic
gravity model of trade.
Recent literature has attempted to augment the gravity model by modifying its variables
to explain trade trends that the classic gravity model does not explain well. For example, In their
1999 paper titled “Controlling for Heterogeneity in Gravity Models of Trade,” Cheng and Wall
improved on the gravity’s model tendency to overestimate trade between low-volume traders and
to underestimate trade between high-volume traders. In order to account for this tendency, Cheng
and Wall relaxed the notion that all countries must share the same gravity constant (in log-linear
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form, same intercept alpha). Instead, their fixed-effects method assumed that there are fixed
factors in the relationships between all countries that make the gravity constant different for each
trading pair. Through their new model, Cheng and Wall were able to control for new factors that
are typically hard to quantify – such as consumer preferences, historical links, and cultural
similarities – as they were now included in each trading pair’s gravity constant. Furthermore, the
authors were able to improve on their ability to capture distance effects. The classic model
utilized distance between two capital cities, which became problematic for countries like the
United States, which has economic centers on both coasts of the relatively large country. These
economic distance effects could now be captured in each country pair’s unique gravity constant.
Other studies that aimed to augment the classic gravity model utilized GDP per capita instead of
GDP, captured not only distance but contiguity and border effects, and incorporated common
language and colonial links.
As it relates to trade disputes, Horn et al. demonstrated in their 1999 paper “Is the use of
the WTO dispute settlement system biased?” that larger economies have more opportunities to
become involved in a trade conflict because their economies are usually more diversified and
they have a larger range of industries. Greater economies such as the United States or Japan, for
example, have a significantly larger range of industries than highly developed small economies
such as Switzerland or New Zealand. As a result, in relation to exports, these larger economies
will be more likely to encounter trade restrictions and initiate disputes. Conversely, given larger
economies’ more diverse set of imports, they are more likely to encounter an import-restricting
measure and raise a dispute.
In their 2005 paper titled “Power plays and capacity constraints: The selection of
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defendants in WTO disputes,” Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons further explore how the
economic size of opposing parties affects countries’ decisions to get involved in trade disputes.
Specifically, they find that larger economies are not only more likely to initiate disputes, as
shown by Horn et al., they are also more likely to be targets of trade disputes. This is explained
by their larger market sizes, which raise the economic stakes involved with every trade
restriction, and incentivizes a country to take legal action against a larger economy. A decision in
favor of the complainant in the case of such a decision and compliance with such a decision by
the defendant garners more gains for the complainant.
The gravity model’s explanatory power in relation to World Trade Organization litigation
is explored by Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer in their 2010 paper titled “Gravitation or
discrimination? Determinants of litigation in the World Trade Organization.” Sattler and
Bernauer test concerns that dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization was largely
motivated by discriminatory factors such as small legal capacity. However, the authors find no
evidence of such discriminatory practices in the WTO. Instead, their findings point to the
significance of the gravity model in explaining dispute initiation.
In order to answer their research question, namely whether WTO litigation is motivated
by discriminatory or gravity factors, the authors utilize a dataset of all directed WTO member
state dyads between 1995 and 2003. Their dependent variable measures how many trade disputes
a country initiated in the WTO in a given year. Sattler and Bernauer determine two “Full
Models,” both of which are enhanced Gravity Models. These models control for log(Trade),
log(GDP A), log(GDP B), Power Asymmetry, Democracy A, and Democracy B, with the first
model also controlling for the number of WTO delegates each country has, and the second model
also controlling for log(GDP/Capita A), log(GDP/Capital B). Apart from WTO delegates in the
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first model, all of the other variables are significant in explaining how many WTO disputes are
initiated by each dyadic pair.
Problematically, however, by utilizing trade as one of their independent variables, Sattler
and Bernauer likely run into endogeneity problems. This is because trade and trade disputes are
likely jointly determined. While country characteristics such as GDP and polity scores might
arguably be thought of as exogenous and can help explain both trade and trade disputes between
two countries, it is somewhat unsatisfactory to put trade on the right hand side alongside the
variables that predict trade in a regression with complaint/dispute status on the left-hand side.
Furthermore, by utilizing GDP and GDP-per-capita of both countries, as well as their Power
Asymmetry (which the authors define as the absolute value of log(GDP Ratio)), Sattler and
Bernauer run seemingly run into multicollinearity issues. GDP-per-capita is just GDP divided by
population and GDP Ratio divides both GDPs by each other. Putting all three on the right-hand
side of the regression means the three independent variables will be highly correlated with each
other. Although the bundle of regressors may be significant, the standard errors are enlarged. It
becomes difficult to interpret each coefficient in the regression separately, and small changes to
the input data can lead to large changes in the parameter estimates. In order to avoid these issues
in my own regressions, I use only log of distance in my specifications alongside log GDP (hence
capturing the main components of a gravity trade equation) but I do not use the GDP-per-capita
and ‘Power Asymmetry’ variables which, as just pointed out, are functions of partner log(GDP)
already.
Settlement Theory
My continuity variable is backed up by settlement theory, which generally carries
explanatory power when it comes to the initiation and resolution of disputes. Specifically, theory
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dictates that the nature of disputes makes certain cases relatively easier and therefore more likely
to settle, and certain cases harder and therefore harder to settle.
Ronald Coase’s paper titled “The Problem of Social Cost,” is one of the pillars of
settlement theory. As he pointed out, in a world free of information asymmetry and transaction
costs, every single dispute will settle outside of formal adjudication – if settling a dispute leads to
gains to trade then it will be in the parties’ interest to resolve those disputes and capture those
gains. In the context of the WTO, for example, member countries would resolve disagreements
over allegedly illegal trade barriers outside of the dispute resolution system to avoid the costs
associated with formal adjudication. However, in the real world, bargains take time, energy, and
are subject to various issues. One such issue, information asymmetry, occurs when the parties of
a dispute have access to different amounts of information and are, hence, unable to clearly see
the bargaining range they are facing. Either countries think their likelihood of winning is higher
than it actually is, or they fear that they don’t stand a chance against their adversary. Another
issue, transaction costs, refers more broadly to the costs associated with the parties involved in
trying to find a settlement outcome that is suitable to both sides.
Most research that attempts to explain dispute settlement in the WTO focuses on the idea
that in a world with information asymmetry, states will typically fail to reach agreements through
settlement. However, in their paper titled “To Settle or Empanel?,” Beth Simmons and Andrew
Guzman offer a unique application of settlement theory to WTO disputes in that they explore
transaction costs as the main reason behind a case’s likelihood of settlement.
Specifically, Simmons and Guzman explore the explanatory power of the nature of a
dispute when it comes to whether or not a case settles. In their paper, Guzman and Simmons
classify discontinuous cases as “lumpy” and relatively continuous cases as “non-lumpy.” The
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former group involves “all-or-nothing” cases (e.g. those concerning bans or health and safety
regulations) for which there is relatively little bargaining space. For example, the two most likely
outcomes in the case of a disputed ban are (1) lifting the ban, which is a win for the party
disputing it and a loss for the party that instated the ban, or (2) keeping the ban, which is a win
for the party that instated the ban and a loss for the party disputing the ban. In the case of an
import quota, on the other hand, countries are able to negotiate a number that is acceptable to
both sides, i.e., reach a middle ground. The latter group, therefore, includes goods that are more
easily divisible, such as tariffs and quotas. The scholars hypothesize that when the subject matter
is “lumpy,” i.e. non-continuous, the parties’ ability to reach an agreement through the use of
transfers is restricted. Conversely, goods that are relatively continuous provide for a more
expansive bargaining space, and as a result, result in a larger likelihood of settlement. The
authors analyze data for all cases brought to the WTO from its inception until the end of 2000.
Simmons and Guzman find support for their hypothesis, but only among democratic states. In
other words, classic settlement theory seems to hold up: cases with more bargaining room are
more likely to settle.
The authors give three reasons behind the existence of such transaction costs in WTO
disputes. First, in a settlement, the inclusion of concessions unrelated to the dispute at hand is
harder to approve through parties’ domestic political institutions and as a result create a
constraint. Second, in a settlement, the inclusion of concessions unrelated to the dispute at hand
is unfavorable to the nation making the concession, as it will have to be extended to all members
of the WTO under the MFN principle. Lastly, the use of cash, which is an easily divisible
settlement device that technically makes every single dispute “continuous,” is extremely rare. As
a result, these constraints point to the presence of significant transaction costs, which are
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essential to study as a possible explanation for why some disputes are able to settle and others
are not.
Importantly, Guzman and Simmons focus on settlement of a dispute once a dispute has
already been initiated. The “settlement” that formulates my dependent variable is resolving an
alleged illegal trade barrier outside of the WTO dispute resolution system entirely, rather than
escalating it into a dispute. It is also crucial to note that the Guzman-Simmons paper was written
much earlier into the establishment of the WTO and hence featured a relatively small sample size
of 216 disputes.
A wide range of settlement literature provides additional explanations as to why some
cases are successfully able to settle, while others are not. Leandra Lederman, for example, argues
that cases go to trial because of a failure to establish a common bargaining range in which a
surplus is created and divided among the two parties. This failure can be attributed to four
reasons: (1) classic information asymmetry – the parties' estimates of the trial outcome are not
identical (2) the parties do not have symmetric stakes in the litigation, (3) the parties are not riskneutral and (4) the parties engage in strategic behavior in negotiating the division of the costs
they will save by not going to trial (Lederman). The second reason is especially applicable to the
WTO, given that parties may differ in size and political system, and stand to lose or gain very
different amounts economically and politically. The third reason also makes sense in the context
of the WTO; it can be argued that states are risk-averse (at least in democracies) because
governments are accountable to the people they represent.
Though settlement is the preferred outcome, if it is not achieved, courts are essential in
partaking in bargains and achieving the same efficient outcome that would be achieved in the
ideal world that Coase theorized about. Empirically, however, cases are generally far more likely
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to settle outside of judicial proceedings, pointing to the fact that there are high benefits of
settlements and/or very high costs to adjudication. Trade-related complaints are in line with
classical settlement theory, as most complaints fail to be escalated into WTO disputes. Once
WTO disputes have been initiated, however, disputes settle at far lower rates than cases in
domestic court systems.
Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill explain general benefits to settlement through costreduction arguments, party-preference arguments, superior-outcome arguments, and superior
general effects arguments. The cost-reduction arguments stress that settlement saves both, the
parties and the courts, time, energy, and money. Party-preference arguments point to parties’
desire to avoid court, greater satisfaction among parties, and a better meeting of parties’ needs
when a case is resolved through settlement. The third body of arguments, superior-outcome,
states that settlement helps parties achieve the “golden mean” of all possible outcomes and leads
to outcomes that rest on superior knowledge of the cases. Additionally, settlement allows parties
to utilize a wider set of norms, encourages their inventiveness when it comes to finding a
solution, leads to greater compliance, and changes the nature of participants’ general behavior.
Lastly, the superior general effects arguments state that settlement is beneficial because it acts as
a deterrent of future undesirable behavior, acts as a moral example and educator, encourages or
discourages future claims, and sets precedents about legal standards for other parties.
The cost-reduction arguments are easily applicable to complaints filed by corporations
with their domestic governments against trade restrictions – settlement helps states avoid
spending the money, time, and legal resources that formal adjudication, i.e., WTO dispute
initiation, requires. Additionally, unlike outcomes achieved prior to or during settlement, reports
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issued by formal panels are accessible by the public, and “litigants no longer enjoy insulation
from domestic interests” (Busch et al.).
Apart from examining the causes and benefits to settlement in general settlement
literature, I also examine what factors specific to the WTO have been found to increase the
likelihood of settlement. In “Settling WTO Disputes: What do Litigation Models Tell Us?,”
Amelia Porges questions why the likelihood of settlement in the WTO’s dispute resolution
system is so much lower than in that of domestic courts. Porges divides litigation and negotiation
models into two categories: ones that are based on optimism of negotiation WTO members, and
ones that are based on information asymmetry. She comes up with three explanations for why
members of the WTO are less likely to settle: both sides are too optimistic, asymmetries of
information are most possible at the time of settlement, or the defending party has insufficient
incentives to “pay to make the case go away.”
In sum, settlement between two states in the WTO is less likely than traditional
settlement between two individual parties because the two groups often have different levels of
incentives, investment, and information in pursuing certain outcomes. These are all
considerations that countries keep in mind not only once a WTO dispute has been initiated, but
also when deciding whether or not to bring a dispute to the WTO in the first place. Porges’
examination of the complexities of the WTO dispute resolution system make it clear that though
complaint and dispute settlement in the WTO can be explained by general settlement theory, it is
also far more nuanced than settlement within domestic courts.
Polity in Dispute Initiation
A partner nation’s polity score controls for how democratic it is in terms of an index that
accounts for factors such as the competitiveness and openness of its elections, the nature of its

20

general political participation, and the level of limitations on the nation’s executive authority.
The score can range from -10 to 10, with scores of 6 to 10 classified as democracies. Past
literature has conjectured that a nation’s polity score, which I control for in my augmented
gravity model, is positively related to dispute initiation. As explored by Todd Allee in his 2002
paper titled “Legal Incentives and Domestic Rewards: The Selection of Trade Disputes for
GATT/WTO Dispute Resolution,” the argument behind this is that “leaders of societies that hold
strong beliefs in the rule of law and the desirability of allowing courts to resolve disputes” are
more likely to then utilize these courts, as opposed to “resolving” these disputes through other
means.
Concentration of Trade Barriers
In my augmented model, I also explore whether the concentration of a trade barrier,
namely, whether a barrier affects many WTO members or only a few, affects the likelihood of its
escalation as a dispute in the WTO. For example, banning a good from a specific country is a
barrier concentrated on that one specific country. On the other hand, something like subsidizing
domestic companies that produce certain goods depress prices of that good worldwide, thereby
affecting all countries that also produce this good. This is a prime example of a diffuse trade
barrier. Previous theory suggests that a barrier that affects a small sample of WTO members, or
the United States alone, are less likely to settle outside of formal adjudication. In their paper
titled “Free-Riding on Enforcement in the WTO” written in 2016, Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J.
Pelc found that in cases of diffuse policies, many can benefit from litigation but no one country
wants to take on the costs. In other words, collective action problems make it less likely that the
United States will escalate a complaint based on a barrier that affects many other countries.
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Hypothesis
This study has two primary goals. First, I explore whether the gravity model has
explanatory power when used to analyze whether trade barriers enacted against the United States
are pursued by the USTR and escalated into disputes. Second, I explore the extent to which novel
variables such as the continuity of a complaint and the concentration of a barrier can add
explanatory power to the gravity model. These hypotheses are all specific to explaining whether
complaints filed by international firms are then brought to the WTO by the USTR as formal
disputes.
I hypothesize that the gravity model should help explain whether a complaint is escalated
by the USTR into a dispute, or whether it is instead resolved outside of formal adjudication. Prior
literature suggests that the gravity model helps explain the number of disputes that are initiated
between pairs of countries within the WTO, and similarly, in line previous literature, I believe
that it should hold explanatory power when determining whether the USTR disputes a barrier in
the WTO.
H1: Trade and the escalation of complaints to disputes should rise directly with GDP of the
trading partner and inversely with distance between the U.S. and the trading partner.
I hypothesize that the nature of a complaint has a direct effect on whether the complaint
is brought to the WTO as a dispute by the USTR, or whether it is resolved outside of the WTO
by other means. Past literature has shown this relationship to be significant, albeit early on in the
existence of the World Trade Organization and in relation to disputes that have already been
initiated. I believe that cases that are non-continuous and therefore harder to settle outside of
formal adjudication, will have a higher chance of being brought to the WTO’s dispute resolution
system. Furthermore, as explored by past literature, I believe that polity and barrier concentration
also hold explanatory power in determining the escalation of a complaint into a dispute.
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H2: Trade and the escalation of complaints to disputes should rise directly with the polity level
of the trade partner enacting an allegedly illegal trade barrier, the concentration of the trade
policy, and the continuity of the trade policy in question.
Data
The bulk of my data stems from a dataset originally compiled by Christina Davis in 2012,
and later expanded by Professors Yildirim, Poletti, Chatagnier, and De Bievre in 2018. This
dataset compiles all allegedly illegal trade barriers enacted against the United States by Canada,
Mexico, the EU, Brazil, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, reported between 1995
and 2012. The final dataset produced an unbalanced panel of 2,334 complaints, of which 5%
became WTO disputes. Each observation enters the dataset in the first year that the allegedly
illegal trade barrier is reported to the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office. My dependent variable
is coded one if the US initiates a WTO dispute over the barrier following the enactment of the
barrier, and zero otherwise. Additional characteristics that were most of interest to me for each
complaint were the parties involved, trade volume between the US and the partner in each
complaint, and the policy in question (i.e. why the barrier is allegedly illegal).
In contrast to the dataset utilized by Sattler and Bernauer that included all dyadic pairs in
the WTO but only one observation per dyadic pair and year, my dataset is limited to the USA
and the nine trading partners listed above. However, my dataset contains multiple complaints per
partner-pair and year, and my focus is the factors that determine the transition from complaint to
WTO dispute. The dataset also includes only trade barriers reported by internationally active
firms to the United States as complaints, possibly leaving out observations representing barriers
enacted that were never reported.
I merged this dataset with the Dynamic Gravity Dataset for 1948-2016, compiled by
Tamara Gurevich and Peter Herman and released by the United States International Trade
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Commission. This dataset seeks to provide core gravity-related characteristics for every country
pair in every year between 1948 and 2016, including macroeconomic, cultural, and geographic
indicators. From this dataset, I was most interested in obtaining GDP characteristics of the
parties in the complaints in my original dataset, which I merged with my original dataset by
partner name and year. I also utilized the distance and polity scores from the Dynamic Gravity
Dataset.
Finally, I also manually coded for the ‘continuity’ of each complaint. I modeled my
coding based off of the work published by Simmons and Guzman. The authors published their
coding for WTO cases that they analyzed prior to 2000, where they label disputes as either
“continuous” or “non-continuous.” Disputes concerning import bans, technical regulations, and
intellectual property, for example, leave little room to compromise and are considered “all-ornothing.” In my paper, therefore, I code them as non-continuous. Disputes concerning import
quotas, quantitative restrictions, and anti-dumping duties, on the other hand, leave greater room
for outcomes acceptable to both parties, and are coded as continuous. I summarize the theory
behind this coding in my literature review.
In order to create my binary independent variable, I followed the pattern used by
Simmons and Guzman. I determined the continuity based on the policy in question of each
complaint, which was reported in the Yildirim et al. dataset. Continuous cases were coded as one
and non-continuous cases were coded as zero. Cases were only coded as continuous if they had
to do with tariffs, nonzero quotas, import restrictions, and subsidies. Otherwise, I coded them as
non-continuous. It is important to note that the original paper that coded for this variable had
three people cross-checking each other’s work. In order to keep the variable as robust as
possible, I utilized a strict rule system to code for it, as described above.
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The following are some statistics summarizing the distribution of my key variables:
according to the classification that I used, about 81% of complaints are considered noncontinuous, while 19% of complaints are considered continuous. In regard to my dependent
variable, 95% of complaints do not end up becoming disputes, while 5% do. In absolute terms,
out of 2,331 complaints in my dataset, 114 end up becoming disputes.
As observed from the summary statistics below, the number of cases per year is rising,
but the fraction of complaints that become WTO disputes is falling. This suggests that it is
important to have year dummies in my regressions to control for year fixed effects.

Summary Statistics Table 1

Year

Complaints
0
1

Continuity
0
1

Avg. Polity
Score
-

Concentration
0
1

Total

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

163
173
183
202
227
236
237
262
267
270

20
17
17
11
14
11
8
9
5
2

141
150
157
174
194
200
199
226
228
232

42
40
43
39
47
47
46
45
44
40

161
171
182
196
220
228
226
253
253
252

22
19
18
17
21
19
19
18
19
20

7.49
7.46
7.80
8.13
8.19
8.24
8.07
8.23
8.20
8.17

183
190
200
213
241
247
245
271
272
272

Total

2,220

114

1,901

433

2,142

192

2,334

2,334
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Summary Statistics Table 2

Partner
Brazil
Canada
EU
India
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Singapore
U.S.A.
Total

Complaints
0
1
195
194
416
223
410
401
162
104
115
-

8
19
42
3
9
13
0
20
0
-

Continuity
0
1

Concentration
0
1

179 24
161 52
389 69
156 70
374 45
308 106
129 33
97 27
108
7
-

198
201
430
214
387
359
140
98
115
-

5
12
28
12
32
55
22
26
0
-

2,220 114 1,901 433

2,142

192

Avg. Polity
Score
-

Distance
-

8.00
10.00
10.00
9.00
10.00
7.48
3.00
6.73
-2.00
10.00

8058
2135
7596
13163
10229
10,646
14807
2493
15101
-

-

-

Avg.
GDP 1995
-

Avg.
GDP 2004
-

1.39E+12
1.10E+12
1.20E+13
6.04E+11
5.06E+12
5.51E+11
1.29E+11
6.87E+11
1.02E+11
1.03E+13

1.72E+12
1.48E+12
1.57E+13
1.03E+12
5.58E+12
8.61E+11
1.94E+11
9.27E+11
1.59E+11
1.39E+13

-

-

Total
203
213
458
226
419
414
162
124
115
2,334

Methods
Since my outcome variable is dichotomous, I employ a logit model across all of my
specifications to model the probability of settlement.
In the first set of regressions below, I model the relationships governed by a basic gravity
model, where partner country GDP – or really the product of US GDP and partner country GDP
– and product of distance determine the volume of trade and disputes.1 I also test an alternate
specification of this gravity model, in which I replaced distance with trade, as did Sattler and

1

In a classic version of the gravity equation, we have Yit = G*(GDP_usa_t)b1 *(GDP_partner_t)b2 / (distance)b3,
which in log form yields a regression of the form:
lnYit = b0 + b1 *lnGDP_usa_t + b2*lnGDP_partner_t - b3*lnDistance_i_t ,where b0 = lnG. However since
b1*lnGDP_usa_t is constant across partner countries in year t, this will be observed in the year fixed effects.
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Bernauer in their augmented gravity models. I tested both models with and without fixed year
effects.
In the next set of my regressions, I expand from this base specification to include my
continuity variable in order to test whether it holds any explanatory power in determining
whether a complaint is pursued by the USTR and is therefore escalated into a WTO dispute. I
next augment my gravity model even further, by including polity and trade barrier concentration.
I created two versions of each specification: one with fixed year effects and one without.
Results
Part I
The stripped-down gravity model proved to be significant in determining whether
complaints were escalated into WTO disputes (Table 1, Column 1). As expected, the coefficient
on log(Distance) was negative and the coefficient of log(GDP B) was positive. The further away
a country is from the United States, the less the United States trades with that country, and the
less likely the United States is to initiate a WTO dispute with that country. At the same time, the
more economic power a trading partner holds, the more interest the United States has in trading
with that country, and the more likely the United States is to initiate a WTO dispute with that
country if it enacts trade policies which are unfavorable to the U.S. Signs and significance of the
coefficients stayed consistent when I controlled for fixed year effects (Table 1, Column 2).
Given that my specification is a logit model, in order to interpret the coefficients of my
variables, I cannot look at their values directly but rather turn to their marginal effects. Marginal
effects are beneficial in that they present results as differences in probabilities, which is more
informative than odds ratios and relative risks. In other words, by looking at the margins, I can
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tell what each specific variable’s effect is on increasing the likelihood of my dependent outcome
(WTO dispute initiation), provided all other variables are kept at their means.
I first examine the marginal effects of my simple gravity model (Table 2, Column 1).
Though distance in my dataset is measured in kilometers, because it is logged, its effects are
discussed in percentage terms. Making the distance greater by one percent decreases the odds of
escalation of a dispute by 5%, holding all other variables (i.e. GDP of the trading partner) at their
means. This effect is statistically significant. On the other hand, increasing GDP B by one
percent while holding log(Distance) at its mean. increases the likelihood of complaint escalation
by 1%. This marginal effect is also statistically significant. The value and significance of the
marginal effects stay the same when I control for fixed year effects (Table 2, Column 2).
When I ran the same model substituting log(Trade) for log(Distance), I found that though
trade itself is significant in determining dispute initiation, log(GDP B) becomes insignificant
(Table 1, Column 3). The sign and significance of the coefficients remain the same, when
controlling for fixed year effects. This points to the notion that log(Distance) seems to better
capture the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and its trading partners than log(Trade), since
log(GDP B) and log(Distance) predict log(Trade) and elements that predict trade on the righthand side of my regression creates problems. This may further indicate the endogeneity problems
embedded in utilizing trade to determine the likelihood of a WTO dispute.
In terms of marginal effects, trade has less of an effect than does distance in predicting
the likelihood of WTO dispute initiation (Table 2, Column 3). Increasing the volume of trade
between the U.S. and its trading partner by one percent increases the odds of escalation of a
dispute by 3%, holding all other variables (i.e. GDP of the trading partner) at their means. This
effect is statistically significant. On the other hand, increasing the log(GDP B) by one unit, i.e.
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increasing GDP B by one percent, while holding log(Trade) at its mean increases the likelihood
of complaint escalation by 0.4%. This marginal effect is not statistically significant, as isn’t the
coefficient in the original regression. The value and significance of the marginal effects stay the
same when I control for fixed year effects (Table 2, Column 4).
Part II
I next augment my basic gravity specification to explore the hypotheses that other
variables have potential explanatory power in predicting whether the USTR will escalate a
complaint into a WTO dispute.
The continuity variable proved to be significant in determining whether complaints were
escalated into WTO disputes when added to my previous gravity model specification (Table 3,
Column 1), increasing the likelihood of dispute initiation by 4%, according to its marginal effects
(Table 4, Column 1). Paradoxically, the variable had a positive coefficient, pointing to the notion
that cases that are continuous and theoretically less likely to be escalated into disputes, are
actually more likely to be escalated by the USTR. The sign, significance, and marginal effects of
log(Distance) and log(GDP B) remained the same as in the regressions in Part I. The addition of
the continuity variable therefore points to the robustness of the previous gravity specification.
The sign, significance, and marginal effects of all variables also stayed consistent when I
controlled for fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 2 and Table 4, Column 2).
With regard to the positive coefficient obtained on the “continuity” variables in Columns
1-8 of Table 2, perhaps, the reverse story is happening. When cases are continuous and therefore
easier to reach a compromise on, the USTR thinks the odds are heavily in its favor. The USTR
may then think that it has a chance of obtaining even more favorable results (i.e. “winning)
through formal adjudication than through any concessions obtained through settlement. It is
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therefore more likely to escalate a complaint and initiate dispute proceedings within the WTO.
This is in line with the “too optimistic” story told by Porges.
Alternatively, in non-continuous cases, it is a lot harder for cases to find a “middle
ground,” meaning any solution will likely have a clear winner and a clear loser. The only way for
the USTR to “win” the case is if the outcome of its settlement or adjudication results in a
complete reversal of the policy in question (e.g. a ban in question gets lifted). Given that this
outcome is harder to achieve through settlement and adjudication alike (as opposed to a
relatively smaller adjustment in policy), the USTR calculates that the risk and resources involved
with initiating a dispute based on such a matter is not worth the potential rewards. Instead, the
USTR decides to focus its resources elsewhere and avoids formal adjudication altogether. This is
in line with Porges’ claim that asymmetries of information are heightened at time of settlement.
Next, I augment my model by controlling for the polity score of the trading partner in
each complaint. The coefficient on polity proves to be positive and significant at a 5% level
(Table 3, Column 3), though this significance disappears when the specification controls for
fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 4). This points to the notion that the United States is more
likely to initiate a dispute with a more democratic trading partner, which is contrary to what
theory may predict. One possible explanation for the signage of the polity coefficient is that the
United States is more likely to share closer relations with its more democratic trading partners,
and is more successfully able to resolve a complaint without resorting to dispute initiation in the
WTO.
In the specifications that control for polity (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4), the sign,
significance, and marginal effects of log(Distance), log(GDP B), and continuity remained the
same as in all earlier regressions. The marginal effects of polity reveal that the variable increases
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the likelihood of WTO dispute initiation by 0.6% (significant), and this effect goes down to 0.4%
(non-significant) when controlling for fixed year effects.
My final variable of interest is the concentration of a barrier and whether it affects its
likelihood of being escalated as a formal WTO dispute. I add it to my previous regression, and
find that the variable has a positive coefficient, as expected, but is not significant at a 5% level
(Table 3, Column 5). It’s p-value, however, reveals that the variable is significant at a 10% level.
The coefficient of the variable remains positive and insignificant when the regression controls
for fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 6). It’s p-value, however, reveals that the variable is
significant at a 10% level. My regressions reveal that the United States is more likely to
challenge barriers that affect solely the United States, as opposed to a multitude of countries, but
at relatively lower significance levels.
The marginal effects of all variables but concentration proved to be significant at this
stage of the regression (Table 4, Column 5). The sign, significance, and marginal effect of these
remaining variables remained consistent with earlier regressions, with and without controlling
for fixed year effects. Notably, in the specification that controlled for fixed year effects (Table 4,
Column 6), the marginal effects of concentration were significant at a 10% level, revealing that a
case being concentrated increased its likelihood of being escalated into a dispute by 2%.
When I ran the same model substituting log(Trade) for log(Distance), I found that the
only significant variables in the specification were log(Trade) and continuity (Table 3, Column
7). This result was consistent when controlling for fixed year effects (Table 3, Column 8). In
terms of marginal effects, a one percent increase in trade between the U.S. and its trading
partner, increased the likelihood of dispute initiation by 3%, with and without controlling for
fixed effects (Table 4, Columns 7 and 8). The results once again point to the notion that
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log(Distance) seems to better capture the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and its trading
partners than log(Trade), even when the model is augmented with the previously discussed
variables, because utilizing distance avoids probable endogeneity issues that utilizing trade
causes.
Notably, certain key results, such as the sign and significance of log(Distance), log(GDP
B), and continuity proved to be robust to changes in specification, as did the sign and
significance of the marginal effects of these variables. The augmented gravity model that utilizes
log(Distance), continuity, concentration, polity, and controls for year fixed effects is my
preferred specification. The model most closely incorporates the classic gravity model and
includes variables of interest backed up by theory that are typically under-utilized but hold
explanatory power in predicting WTO dispute initiation.
Limitations
Though my results are robust and largely in line with what theory predicts, they also face
several limitations that are important to mention. First, it is difficult to capture in a simple
empirical framework relationships that are complicated, nonlinear and simultaneous, such as the
relationship between two countries and their propensity for dispute initiation. It is also hard, if
not impossible, to ‘identify’ causal mechanisms in such a world as there are no obvious
instrumental variables to identify simultaneous equation models. In making an effort to try to
remove endogenous right-hand side variables, the regressions I estimated are reduced forms.
It is also critical to note that this paper was specific to the United States and only nine of
its WTO-member trading partners. Future research may expand on this paper by including all of
the United States’ WTO-member trading partners, and by performing similar studies specific to
other countries (e.g. the European Union). Furthermore, this paper assumes that if a complaint is
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not escalated into a WTO dispute, it is resolved and/or settled through other channels, outside of
formal adjudication. However, it may be the case that the USTR simply chooses to ignore some
of the complaints that it receives and that from the companies’ perspectives, they never actually
get “resolved.” Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, future studies can consider
incorporating a two-stage model that explains how trade relationships first escalate into
complaints and from there turn into WTO disputes.
Conclusion
My results reveal that a simple gravity model can be successfully used to predict whether
the USTR will escalate a complaint filed by an international company into a dispute. The
economic size of a trading partner and the distance between the partner and the United States
points not only to a larger propensity for trade between the two, but also to a larger propensity
for disputes. In other words, the larger and more diverse economies are, and the closer they are
geographically, the more they will trade. With more trade comes a greater possibility of allegedly
illegal trade barriers, and the United States becomes more likely to initiate a dispute in the WTO.
It remains puzzling why polity’s coefficient is signed in the opposite direction of what
theory would predict. A potential explanation for this is that the United States is likely to have
closer relations to its trading partners that are more democratic, and is therefore able to resolve a
complaint through negotiations that take place outside of formal adjudication.
Similarly, continuity’s sign is contradictory to what theory suggests. This signifies that
perhaps, the story behind settlement prior to dispute initiation in the WTO is different than what
prior literature states. Alternatively, this finding suggests the potential of curvilinear data – a
distribution in which cases that are very continuous (i.e., theoretically very easy to settle) and
very non-continuous (i.e., theoretically very hard to settle) both settle. The first group of cases

33

contains an enormous amount of bargaining room for both parties and follows what classic
settlement theory would predict, while the second group of cases is difficult to solve and likely to
make the United States wary of the costs involved in pursuing the case. The “difficult” nature of
these complaints therefore causes the USTR to avoid formal adjudication. The cases in the
middle of the spectrum, therefore, are the ones that are likely to end up adjudicated through the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism.
The consistent signage and significance of the distance and GDP across various
specifications points to the robustness of the variables under the gravity model. Distance also
seems to be a better predictor than trade, which is what has been used in prior literature, but is an
endogenous variable that may skew findings. Additionally, variables such as continuity, polity,
and concentration successfully augment the gravity model, and add explanatory power to why
certain complaints escalate into WTO disputes. These variables are relatively underutilized in
studies exploring dispute initiation, but my results reveal that they hold explanatory power. My
augmented specification is also unique in its balance of inclusion of characteristics of the parties
involved in each potential dispute and the inclusion of characteristics specific to the complaint
itself.
As discussed above, future research may expand on this paper to include the United
States’ trading partners beyond solely Canada, the EU, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, Malaysia,
India, Japan, and South Korea. Additionally, my preferred specifications may be tested from the
perspective of other countries and their trading partners, as opposed to just from the perspective
of the United States. Finally, future studies may explore a two-stage model that explains how
trade relationships affect the filing of complaints, and how these complaints eventually turn into
WTO disputes.
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Figures
Figure 1: Disputes and Complaints, by Year
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Figure 2: Disputes and Complaints, by Country
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Tables
Table 1
Effect of Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation
WTO_dispute

(1)

(2)

lndistance

-1.108***

-1.110***

(-7.21)

(-7.01)

lntrade

lngdpother

(3)

(4)

0.651***

0.754***

(4.51)

(4.85)

0.328***

0.362***

-0.0903

-0.101

(3.92)

(4.26)

(-0.93)

(-1.03)

-2.547

-2.564

-21.52***

-23.60***

(-1.11)

(-1.10)

(-6.27)

(-6.33)

Fixed Year Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2334

2334

2334

2334

_cons

Standard errors in parentheses ="* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001"
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Table 2
Marginal Effects of Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation
WTO_dispute

(1)

(2)

lndistance

-0.0500***

-0.0486***

(-6.45)

(-6.43)

lntrade

lngdpother

(3)

(4)

0.0298***

0.0336***

(4.28)

(4.61)

0.0148***

0.0158***

-0.00413

-0.00451

(3.76)

(4.09)

(-0.93)

(-1.03)

Fixed Year Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2334

2334

2334

2334

Standard errors in parentheses ="* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001"
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Table 3
Effect of Augmented Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation
WTO_dispute

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

lndistance

1.086***

1.108***

1.249***

1.209***

1.238***

1.211***

(-7.05)

(-6.98)

(-7.14)

(-6.91)

(-7.07)

(-6.91)

lntrade

lngdpother

continuity

(7)

(8)

0.617***

0.719***

(4.15)

(4.44)

0.356***

0.384***

0.541***

0.512***

0.544***

0.513***

-0.0535

-0.0994

(4.22)

(4.50)

(4.43)

(4.16)

(4.43)

(4.13)

(-0.46)

(-0.85)

0.840***

0.809***

0.886***

0.844***

0.734**

0.691**

0.734**

0.663**

(3.92)

(3.72)

(4.11)

(3.86)

(3.09)

(2.90)

(3.12)

(2.81)

-0.153*

-0.104

-0.147*

-0.0963

0.0150

0.0329

(-2.21)

(-1.48)

(-2.08)

(-1.34)

(0.23)

(0.49)

0.523

0.557

0.494

0.475

(1.73)

(1.84)

(1.66)

(1.59)

polity_o

concentrated

-3.744

-3.435

-6.272*

-5.303*

-6.524*

-5.441*

21.85***

23.06***

(-1.60)

(-1.46)

(-2.39)

(-1.97)

(-2.46)

(-2.01)

(-5.11)

(-4.89)

Fixed Year Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

_cons

Standard errors in parentheses ="* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001"
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Table 4
Marginal Effects of Augmented Gravity Specification in Predicting WTO Dispute Initiation

WTO_dispute

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

lndistance

0.0484***

0.0479***

0.0556***

0.0523***

0.0549***

0.0522***

(-6.38)

(-6.45)

(-6.44)

(-6.40)

(-6.41)

(-6.40)

lntrade

lngdpother

continuity

(7)

(8)

0.0279***

0.0316***

(3.98)

(4.26)

0.0159***

0.0166***

0.0241***

0.0221***

0.0241***

0.0221***

-0.00242

-0.00437

(4.04)

(4.32)

(4.23)

(4.02)

(4.23)

(4.00)

(-0.46)

(-0.85)

0.0375***

0.0350***

0.0394***

0.0365***

0.0326**

0.0298**

0.0332**

0.0291**

(3.82)

(3.66)

(3.99)

(3.78)

(3.04)

(2.87)

(3.06)

(2.77)

-0.00682*

-0.00451

-0.00651*

-0.00415

0.000677

0.00145

(-2.19)

(-1.47)

(-2.06)

(-1.34)

(0.23)

(0.49)

0.0232

0.0240

0.0224

0.0209

(1.72)

(1.83)

(1.65)

(1.59)

polity_o

concentrated

Fixed Year
Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

2334

Standard errors in parentheses ="* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001"
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